SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Remuneração de Executivos e Desempenho no Mercado Brasileiro: Relações Contemporâneas e Defasadas
16 references·2 citing·43 second hop
Remuneração de Executivos e Desempenho no Mercado Brasileiro: Relações Contemporâneas e Defasadas (2017)Remuneração de Executivos e Desempenho no…Econometric Analysis of Panel Data (2021)Econometric Analysis of Panel…Duration of Executive Compensation (2013)Duration of Executive Compens…Work Motivation: History, Theory, Research, and Practice (2012)Work Motivation: History, The…CEO Compensation (2010)CEO CompensationMoving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk (2008)Moving Closer to the Action: …Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007)Executive Compensation: A Mul…BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES OF CEOs TO STOCK OWNERSHIP AND STOCK OPTION PAY. (2001)BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES OF CEOs …UNEQUALLY SPACED PANEL DATA REGRESSIONS WITH AR(1) DISTURBANCES (1999)UNEQUALLY SPACED PANEL DATA R…Chapter 38 Executive compensation (1999)Chapter 38 Executive compensa…CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How (1999)CEO Incentives: It's Not How …Managerial Incentives and Investment in R&D in Large Multiproduct Firms (1993)Managerial Incentives and Inv…CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* (1990)CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW…Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)Agency Theory: An Assessment …Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory (1988)Compensation and Incentives: …Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests (1973)Risk, Return, and Equilibrium…Tracing the links between executive compensation structure and firm performance: evidence from the Brazilian market (2020)Tracing the links between exe…Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity (2018)Composition of the board of d…Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship (1984)Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations (1991)Pooled Mean Group Estimation of Dynamic Heterogeneous Panels (1999)Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (2001)Introductory Econometrics for Finance (2008)A Theory of Social Comparison Processes (1954)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Stock options for undiversified executives (2002)Equity Incentives and Earnings Management (2005)Does it really pay to be green? Determinants and consequences of proactive environmental strategies (2010)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Stock prices and top management changes (1988)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)The Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When is More not Better? (1994)The Growth of Executive Pay (2005)Pay without Performance (2006)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)STRATEGY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES. (2000)Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness (2007)Opinion Paper: “So what if ChatGPT wrote it?” Multidisciplinary perspectives on opportunities, challenges and implications of generative conversational AI for research, practice and policy (2023)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices (1965)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns (1992)Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds (1993)On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance (1997)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers (1989)An examination of the relationship of governance mechanisms to performance (2001)Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S. bank holding companies (2009)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)AFFECT- AND COGNITION-BASED TRUST AS FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERPERSONAL COOPERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS. (1995)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003)Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance (2010)Assessing Managerial Power Theory (2012)CEO compensation in relation to worker compensation across countries: The configurational impact of country‐level institutions (2015)Forecasting with panel data (2008)The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution (2011)Testing Asymmetric-Information Asset Pricing Models (2012)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 2021Econometric Analysis of Panel Data15,089 cited
  • 1973Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests14,248 cited
  • 1989Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review13,327 cited
  • 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
  • 1999Chapter 38 Executive compensation1,569 cited
  • 1999UNEQUALLY SPACED PANEL DATA REGRESSIONS WITH AR(1) DISTURBANCES965 cited
  • 1990CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW*602 cited
  • 2007Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments544 cited
  • 1999CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How544 cited
  • 2010CEO Compensation542 cited
  • 2001BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES OF CEOs TO STOCK OWNERSHIP AND STOCK OPTION PAY.538 cited
  • 2012Work Motivation: History, Theory, Research, and Practice515 cited
  • 2008Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk354 cited
  • 2013Duration of Executive Compensation352 cited
  • 1993Managerial Incentives and Investment in R&D in Large Multiproduct Firms

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

332 cited

Cited by

  • 2018Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity24 cited
  • 2020Tracing the links between executive compensation structure and firm performance: evidence from the Brazilian market20 cited