Advice as a form of social influence: Informational motives and the consequences for accuracy

Abstract

Abstract In this article, we ask how well people fulfill informational motives by using the judgments of others. We build on advice‐taking research from the judgment and decision making literature, which has developed a distinct paradigm to test how accurately people incorporate information from others. We use a literature review to show that people have mixed success in fulfilling informational motives—they increase their accuracy through the use of advice, but not as much as they could. We develop insights about how people perceive advisors and try to pursue advice—and where their perceptions may lead them astray. We conclude by proposing that future work further investigate the reasons people fail to use advice by building on the current advice taking paradigm used in judgment and decision making, but with a richer understanding of advice taking as a dynamic process that often entails complex decisions and normative motives.

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