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Designation and Existence
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Designation and Existence (1939)Designation and ExistenceProperties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic (2021)Properties and Propositions: …The neo-Carnapians (2016)The neo-Carnapians“Literal” Uses of Proper Names (2015)“Literal” Uses of Proper NamesParaphrase Strategies in Metaphysics (2014)Paraphrase Strategies in Meta…A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism (2012)A Quinean Critique of Ostrich…What is ontic structural realism? (2010)What is ontic structural real…Predicate Reference (2009)Predicate ReferenceImplicit ontological commitment (2008)Implicit ontological commitme…Wittgenstein’s conception of mind (2003)Wittgenstein’s conception of …The logical analysis of language (2003)The logical analysis of langu…Mereological Commitments (2000)Mereological CommitmentsThe fallacies of the new theory of reference (1995)The fallacies of the new theo…Forms of realism (1975)Forms of realismAn Explication of ‘Explication’ (1968)An Explication of ‘Explicatio…Belief and Propositions (1957)Belief and PropositionsOntology and the Theory of Meaning (1954)Ontology and the Theory of Me…Word and Object (1960)A World of States of Affairs (1993)Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture (1994)The Sixth Meditation: (2014)Empiricism without magic: transformational abstraction in deep convolutional neural networks (2018)A Theory of Truthmaking (2020)Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951)Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? (1989)From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis (1999)The Epsilon-Reconstruction of Theories and Scientific Structuralism (2015)Notes on Existence and Necessity (1943)On Carnap's views on ontology (1951)Ontology and ideology (1951)On What There is Not (1982)Existence: Essays in Ontology (2014)Meaning and Necessity (1947)Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (1952)Belief, synonymity, and analysis (1955)On What There is (1972)On What Grounds What (2009)Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology (2011)What Can Global Pragmatists Say About Ordinary Objects? (2019)Rethinking Metaphysics (2025)Situations and individuals (2005)Referentialism and Predicativism About Proper Names (2014)Type-Ambiguous Names (2016)The Quality of Thought (2024)The Concept of Mind (2006)Phylogenetic Inference and the Misplaced Premise of Substitution Rates (2021)Tractatus logico-philosophicus (2021)Higher-Order Metaphysics (2024)The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (1959)Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems (1972)Language, Truth and Logic (1973)The effects of open vs. specific goals on flow and clutch states in a cognitive task (2017)Naming and Necessity (1972)Events as Property Exemplifications (1976)Frege : Philosophy of language. By Michael Dummett. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xliii, 708. (1983)Reference and Definite Descriptions (1966)Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (2023)
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Cited by

  • 2012A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism75 cited
  • 1995The fallacies of the new theory of reference71 cited
  • 2010What is ontic structural realism?68 cited
  • 1975Forms of realism64 cited
  • 2000Mereological Commitments60 cited
  • 2015“Literal” Uses of Proper Names55 cited
  • 2021Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic54 cited
  • 1957Belief and Propositions51 cited
  • 1954Ontology and the Theory of Meaning47 cited
  • 2016The neo-Carnapians38 cited
  • 1968An Explication of ‘Explication’36 cited
  • 2014Paraphrase Strategies in Metaphysics34 cited
  • 2009Predicate Reference31 cited
  • 2003The logical analysis of language29 cited
  • 2003Wittgenstein’s conception of mind28 cited
  • 2008Implicit ontological commitment25 cited

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