References

• 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
• 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
• 2003Corporate Governance and Equity Prices6,115 cited
• 1960An Economic Theory of Democracy4,109 cited
• 1979Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure3,372 cited
• 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
• 2007A Theory of Friendly Boards2,413 cited
• 2003Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem2,347 cited
• 2005Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation1,936 cited
• 2001Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are1,740 cited
• 1995Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO1,719 cited
• 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property1,557 cited
• 2002Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation1,405 cited
• 2006The Theory of Corporate Finance1,293 cited
• 2006The Theory of Corporate Finance1,171 cited
• 1990Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices