A shared identity promotes herding in an information cascade game

Sebastian Berger · Christoph Feldhaus · Axel Ockenfels

22 citations0/0 files storedJournal of the Economic Science Association

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

Abstract Our research addresses the effect of shared vs. mixed group identities in an information cascade game. We vary whether subjects always choose after a decision maker who shares the same identity or after a decision maker with a different identity. We find that subjects’ inclination to follow their predecessor is stronger in groups uniquely consisting of ingroup members compared to mixed groups. We relate this result to recent social cognition research.

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2000An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict 1979The Social psychology of intergroup relations 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments 1992A Simple Model of Herd Behavior 2000Economics and Identity*1971Social categorization and intergroup behaviour 2015Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE 2009Group Identity and Social Preferences

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