Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy

Brian J. Cook · B. Dan Wood

78 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Political Science Review

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Public Policy and Administration Research Public Administration and Governance Regulation and Compliance Studies

Abstract

In the March 1988 issue of thisReview, B. Dan Wood invoked a principal-agent perspective to establish the importance of democratic hierarchies in shaping the outputs of public bureaucracies. He tested the model with air pollution enforcements of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) between 1977 and 1985. His results suggested some limitations on bureaucracies' responsiveness to elected political institutions, consistent with a principal-agent perspective with emphasis on the agent. Brian J. Cook challenges features of the design and empirical testing of Wood's hierarchical model. He questions the accuracy of Wood's characterization of the extent of EPA autonomy and power. Cook argues that a proper model requires recognition of the multiple principal nature of the U.S. system, and he advocates consideration of the normative foundations of principal-agent theory. Wood responds to both the substantive and methodological issues raised and suggests an eclectic approach in future research.

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References

1971The Theory of Economic Regulation 2021The Theory of Economic Regulation 1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government 1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms 1967Inside Bureaucracy 1985The Political Economy of Federalism

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