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Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy

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References

1971The Theory of Economic Regulation8,084 cited
2021The Theory of Economic Regulation5,483 cited
1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government5,197 cited
1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation4,771 cited
1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.4,296 cited
1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,936 cited
1967Inside Bureaucracy2,114 cited
1985The Political Economy of Federalism1,445 cited
1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
2021The Politics of Regulation1,085 cited
1975Bureaucrats and Politicians1,028 cited
1984The evolution of management accounting792 cited
1995Democracy and Public Service775 cited
1969Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy.594 cited
1985Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB545 cited
1984The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)503 cited

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Cited by

2000Regulatory Policymaking in the American States: A Review of Theories and Evidence124 cited
1993The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars73 cited
2002Welfare Reform, Mississippi Style: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and the Search for Accountability64 cited
1993Conflict among Regulators and the Hypothesis of Congressional Dominance63 cited
2021Hyper-Management: Neoliberal Expansions of Purpose and Leadership56 cited
2000Beyond Principals and Agents53 cited
2020Deep learning and principal–agent problems of algorithmic governance: The new materialism perspective53 cited
2016Co‐enforcing Labor standards: the unique contributions of state and worker organizations in Argentina and the United States53 cited
2003Das Preis-Leistungs-Verhältnis ökonomischer Fachzeitschriften35 cited
2009Illusions of Accountability27 cited
2022Unpacking the accountability cube and its relationship with blame avoidance26 cited
2022Strategies for dealing with policy ambiguities24 cited
2001LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM AND INFLUENCE ON STATE AGENCIES19 cited
2000Uses and limitations of performance measurement in the civil service: An assessment from the Singapore and New Zealand experiences16 cited
2003Entrepreneurs or Conservators?14 cited
1995Public Policy, Overhead Democracy and the Professional State Revisited14 cited