From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models

Abstract

According to the Lockean thesis (LT), a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable skepticism. Recently, two new solutions to the conflict have been proposed that are alleged to be non-skeptical. We compare these proposals with each other and with the LT, in particular with regard to the question of how much we gain by adopting any one of them instead of the probability 1 requirement, that is of how likely it is that one believes more than the things one is fully certain of.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 30 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.