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Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
16 references·4 citing·36 second hop
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental (2019)Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundame…The Value of Rationality (2017)The Value of RationalityJudgment and Agency (2015)Judgment and AgencyBeing Realistic about Reasons (2014)Being Realistic about ReasonsOn What Matters (2011)On What MattersValue and the right kind of reason (2010)Value and the right kind of r…The Domain of Reasons (2010)The Domain of ReasonsAgainst quietist normative realism (2010)Against quietist normative re…Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity (2009)Self-constitution: agency, id…Slaves of the Passions (2007)Slaves of the PassionsEthics Without Principles (2005)Ethics Without PrinciplesThe Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value (2004)The Strike of the Demon: On F…Ethics Without Principles (2004)Ethics Without PrinciplesHow Truth Governs Belief (2003)How Truth Governs BeliefThe Possibility of Practical Reason (2000)The Possibility of Practical …The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions (2000)The Moralistic Fallacy: On th…Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives (1972)Morality as a System of Hypot…In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity (2022)In Defense of Constitutivism …Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat (2021)Suspension, Higher-Order Evid…Are epistemic reasons normative? (2021)Are epistemic reasons normati…Do epistemic reasons bear on the ought simpliciter? (2019)Do epistemic reasons bear on …A theory of justice original editionMinnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (2009)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)What is inference? (2012)The Language of Morals (1963)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)The impossibility of moral responsibility (1994)Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare (2011)The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents (2012)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)Value in ethics and economics (1994)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Epistemic Partiality in Friendship (2006)The Nature of Normativity (2007)Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)Dispositional Theories of Value (1989)How We Get Along (2009)Slurring Words1 (2011)The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism (2014)Real Definition (2015)There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes (2017)On the Goals of Epistemic Education: Promoting Apt Epistemic Performance (2017)Kant on Reflection and Virtue (2018)Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment (2020)Natural Goodness (2001)The Myth of Morality (2001)The Emotional Construction of Morals (2009)Motivation and Agency (2003)Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts (2009)Being For (2008)A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being (2013)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action (2006)The Subject of Virtue: An Anthropology of Ethics and Freedom (2013)On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models (2021)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2004Ethics Without Principles1,673 cited
  • 2000The Possibility of Practical Reason1,248 cited
  • 1972Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives1,132 cited
  • 2009Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity1,118 cited
  • 2014Being Realistic about Reasons1,095 cited
  • 2000The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions1,071 cited
  • 2011On What Matters769 cited
  • 2004The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value721 cited
  • 2007Slaves of the Passions717 cited
  • 2015Judgment and Agency705 cited
  • 2005Ethics Without Principles672 cited
  • 2003How Truth Governs Belief652 cited
  • 2010The Domain of Reasons377 cited
  • 2010Against quietist normative realism211 cited
  • 2010Value and the right kind of reason173 cited
  • 2017The Value of Rationality169 cited

Cited by

  • 2021Are epistemic reasons normative?43 cited

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  • 2019Do epistemic reasons bear on the ought simpliciter?36 cited
  • 2021Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat33 cited
  • 2022In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity22 cited