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Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples
16 references·5 citing·31 second hop
Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples (2017)Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or wit…Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist (2017)Strong Duality for a Multiple…Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality (2017)Simple mechanisms for subaddi…A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design (2016)A duality based unified appro…Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity (2015)Simple Mechanisms for a Subad…The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014)The sample complexity of reve…A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2014)A Simple and Approximately Op…Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design (2013)Understanding Incentives: Mec…Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization (2012)Optimal Multi-dimensional Mec…Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction (2012)Bayesian optimal auctions via…An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms (2012)An algorithmic characterizati…Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Multi-parameter mechanism des…Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Multi-parameter mechanism des…Chapter 60 Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions (2007)Chapter 60 Nonparametric Appr…Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations (2007)Algorithmic pricing via virtu…Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions (2000)Optimal Nonparametric Estimat…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignMulti-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness (2020)Multi-Item Mechanisms without…A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2020)A Simple and Approximately Op…The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization (2018)The Sample Complexity of Up-t…Selling to a No-Regret Buyer (2018)Selling to a No-Regret BuyerDeep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design (2018)Deep Learning for Multi-Facil…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium (1995)First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue (2017)Targeting and Privacy in Mobile Advertising (2018)The cost of steering in financial markets: Evidence from the mortgage market (2021)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (1988)On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items (2013)Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Combinatorial Auctions (2005)Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015)Incentives in Teams (1973)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination (2013)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation (1994)Deciding Between Competition and Collusion (2003)Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions (2003)Econometric Tools for Analyzing Market Outcomes (2007)Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (1985)Auctions Versus Negotiations (1996)Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting (2019)The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies (2020)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency (1999)Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items (2017)The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2005)The menu-size complexity of auctions (2013)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 2000Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions710 cited
  • 2010Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing422 cited
  • 2007Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations266 cited
  • 2014The sample complexity of revenue maximization198 cited
  • 2012Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization195 cited
  • 2012An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms166 cited
  • 2017Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist164 cited
  • 2014A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer150 cited
  • 2007Chapter 60 Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions133 cited
  • 2010Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing111 cited
  • 2017Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality104 cited
  • 2016A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design103 cited
  • 2013Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design97 cited
  • 2015Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity94 cited

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2012
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction
90 cited

Cited by

  • 2018Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design62 cited
  • 2020A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer45 cited
  • 2018Selling to a No-Regret Buyer41 cited
  • 2020Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness32 cited
  • 2018The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization31 cited