Building a Global Development Cooperation Regime: Failed but Necessary Efforts

Abstract

Abstract This chapter addresses two main questions. First, would a global development cooperation regime serve the 2030 Agenda better than current institutions? Second, how can recent failures to build such a regime be explained given attempts to render the GPEDC more inclusive and legitimate? Drawing from mainstream regime theory and examining recent transformations in the nature of global development cooperation, I argue that a broader regime is necessary and preferable to the status quo for reasons of efficiency. I also resort to models of stakeholder participation in governance institutions to suggest that Brazil, India, and China exited the GPEDC not because of incompatibility of interests with OECD countries, but because they did not value the regime sufficiently and found it difficult to exert influence in it.

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