SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Experimental design to persuade
16 references·3 citing·42 second hop
Experimental design to persuade (2015)Experimental design to persuadeCompetition in Persuasion (2011)Competition in PersuasionBayesian Persuasion (2011)Bayesian PersuasionApparent Overconfidence (2011)Apparent OverconfidenceOptimal Information Disclosure (2010)Optimal Information DisclosureOptimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction (2007)Optimal Information Disclosur…Information structures in optimal auctions (2007)Information structures in opt…Advertising Content (2006)Advertising ContentThe Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values (1992)The Principal-Agent Relations…The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values (1990)The Principal-Agent Relations…Strategic Information Revelation (1990)Strategic Information Revelat…Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (1986)Relying on the Information of…Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design (1986)Partially Verifiable Informat…Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (1983)Mechanism Design by an Inform…Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Strategic Information Transmi…Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Good News and Bad News: Repre…Job Market Signaling (1973)Job Market SignalingPersuasion with unknown beliefs (2022)Persuasion with unknown belie…Censorship as optimal persuasion (2022)Censorship as optimal persuas…Persuasion with Limited Communication (2016)Persuasion with Limited Commu…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Perfect sequential equilibrium (1986)Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information (1987)A survey of agency models of organizations (1988)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts (1990)Collusion Under Asymmetric Information (1997)Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment (2000)Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets (2003)Position Auctions with Consumer Search (2011)Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach (2014)Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design (2019)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)Optimal Auction Design (1981)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts (1995)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions (2007)An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations (1988)Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections (1994)The Economics of Privacy (2016)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2010)The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics (2011)Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation (2014)Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1973Job Market Signaling16,329 cited
  • 1982Strategic Information Transmission4,289 cited
  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 2011Bayesian Persuasion1,913 cited
  • 1986Relying on the Information of Interested Parties1,080 cited
  • 2010Optimal Information Disclosure487 cited
  • 1992The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values485 cited
  • 1983Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal434 cited
  • 2007Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction410 cited
  • 1990The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values400 cited
  • 1990Strategic Information Revelation338 cited
  • 2007Information structures in optimal auctions297 cited
  • 1986Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design264 cited
  • 2006Advertising Content247 cited
  • 2011Competition in Persuasion235 cited
  • 2011Apparent Overconfidence194 cited

Cited by

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

  • 2022Censorship as optimal persuasion47 cited
  • 2016Persuasion with Limited Communication40 cited
  • 2022Persuasion with unknown beliefs33 cited