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Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment · Study

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ArticleStock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment

Volker Laux2012

OA

Articlegreen2012

Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment

126 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Financial Economics

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Stochastic processes and financial applications

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References

1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design 1999Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective 1989Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior 2011Motivating Innovation 2005Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation 2009Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia 1994Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations.1985Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results

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2021The Long‐Term Consequences of Short‐Term Incentives 2017Beyond Diversity: A Tale of Faultlines and Frictions in the Board of Directors 2015Agency models in different stages of CEO tenure: The effects of stock options and board independence on R&D investment 2016Firm performance and comply or explain disclosure in corporate governance 2016Do CEO Succession and Succession Planning Affect Stakeholders' Perceptions of Financial Reporting Risk? Evidence from Audit Fees

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2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.chapter · 9 shared references 2016Executive Compensation: A Modern Primerarticle · 8 shared references 2009Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Managementarticle · 7 shared references 2011Comparing the Investment Behavior of Public and Private Firmsreport · 7 shared references 2013Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulationarticle · 7 shared references 2008Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Managementpreprint · 7 shared references

Details

Year2012

Typearticle

Published2012-06-15

VenueJournal of Financial Economics

ISSN-L0304-405X

Languageen

Citations126

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.06.003

openalex_workW3121908188

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2012Stock option grant vesting terms: economic and financial reporting determinants

2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.

2019Do incentives work? Option-based compensation and corporate innovation