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We examine how firm characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and the firm’s need for specialty knowledge, affect the relationship between corporate governance and the risk of bankruptcy. We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy only for complex firms. Our results also suggest that the proportion of inside directors on the board is inversely associated with the risk of bankruptcy in firms that require more specialist knowledge and that the reverse is true in technically unsophisticated firms. The results further reveal that the additional explanatory power from corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is increased, implying that although corporate governance variables are important predictors, governance changes are likely to be too late to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy.
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