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The Economics of Super Managers · Study

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ArticleThe Economics of Super Managers

Nina Baranchuk2010

OA

Articlegreen2010

The Economics of Super Managers

Nina Baranchuk · Glenn M. MacDonald · Jun Yang

102 citations·0/0 files stored·Review of Financial Studies

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Corporate Finance and Governance Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Merger and Competition Analysis

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References

1983Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity 2003Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies 1978On the Size Distribution of Business Firms 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives 2003Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem 2004CEO incentives and earnings management 2004Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets 2005Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation

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2018Does CEO compensation reflect managerial ability or managerial power? Evidence from the compensation of powerful CEOs 2015The Determinants and Impact of Executive-Firm Matches 2019Talent or popularity: What drives market value and brand image for human brands?2016Urban Agglomeration and CEO Compensation 2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.

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2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.chapter · 18 shared references 2015Which Skills Matter in the Market for CEOs? Evidence from Pay for CEO Credentialsarticle · 12 shared references 2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidencepreprint · 12 shared references 2016Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the rise in CEO payarticle · 11 shared references 2013Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got Therechapter · 10 shared references 2016Executive Compensation: A Modern Primerarticle · 10 shared references

Details

Year2010

Typearticle

Published2010-01-01

VenueReview of Financial Studies

ISSN-L0893-9454

Languageen

Citations102

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1093/rfs/hhr059

openalex_workW3125830715

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2011Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts

2015What Explains the Rise in Executive Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977–2009

2017CEO talent, CEO compensation, and product market competition