Traffic management through link tolls - An approach utilizing side constrained traffic equilibrium models

Abstract

We propose a systematic means for achieving a set of overall traffic\nmanagement or planning goals with respect to the performance of the traffic\nnetwork through the use of link tolls. The primary goals are defined by a set\nof link flow restrictions. The tolls that achieve these goals are \nobtained by solving a generalization of the classical user equilibrium model\nwhich includes a set of side constraints on the link flows. \nThe set of toll prices obtained is not necessarily unique; this fact enables\nthe traffic planner to choose a toll scheme which satisfies exogenous\nconstraints and which may optimize a secondary goal, such as with respect to\nthe toll itself. The overall model is derived as a special case of a\nmathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) describing a\nStackelberg game involving the traffic manager and the users of the network. \nThe model is shown to yield valuable information also in the\ncase where the management goals and exogenous toll constraints are\ninconsistent with each other or with the underlying network. We give several\nexamples of possible applications of the model, including the achievement of a\nsystem optimal flow and the derivation of actions for making public transport\nmore attractive, and propose a conceptual algorithm for solving it. The paper\nis hoped to provoke continued research in both theoretical and applied\ndirections. \n

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