The Rational Roles of Intuition

Abstract

Intuitions often are seen as inputs to theoretical reasoning: e.g. you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value or take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. This chapter argues that in addition to these roles intuitions play a role in guiding action. The chapter reflects on the transmission of justification through inference: inferential internalists justify belief in the conclusion of an argument by inferring it from the premises in that argument. It endorses the idea that one’s ‘seeing’ such a support-relation relies on one’s having an intuition. Introducing Boghossian’s recent work against inferential internalism inspired by Carroll’s dialogue ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles,’ the chapter responds to Boghossian’s argument that intuitions work like mental imperatives and inferences are mental actions performed by obeying them. It then explores what it is in virtue of which intuitions play a guidance role, when they do so.

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