Making sense of charges of scientism in psychology and beyond: Logical and epistemological implications

Abstract

Charges of scientism in mainstream psychology are on the rise among theoretical psychologists, yet not much attention has been paid to the diverse meanings and applications of the term “scientism.” In examining scientism’s relation to such contrast classes as pseudoscience, bad science, and antiscience, I focus on whether allegations of psychology’s scientism are made with the goal of supplementing mainstream ontological and epistemological frameworks and their methodological implications, or supplanting them altogether. The former suggests supplying a mainstream that is seen as thinly conceived with essential missing nutrients, whereas the latter suggests overturning a mainstream that is seen as irreparable and/or irredeemable in its disregard of lived experience. In light of the scientific reform sought by theoretical psychologists, many of whom now turn to the humanities for remedy, I question whether applying the term “scientism” to mainstream psychology is likely to help in achieving theorists’ disciplinary goals, and I suggest alternatives.

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