Subjectivity and method: Why psychology needs more armchair scholarship

Abstract

The argument is based on the premise that method follows subject matter. A representational view of methodology is discussed, arguing that a natural–scientific approach based on variabilization and subdivision of mental life is epistemically insufficient. Subjectivity as the subject matter of psychology must be studied with methods that are capable of addressing wholistic entities and integrating a mostly sociohistorical object, which can be addressed through the psychological humanities. The methodologism of psychology leads to a representational self-misunderstanding that simulates knowledge about human subjectivity but is based on artificial distinctions that are embedded in research practices removed from psychosocial reality. The case is made for representational as well as nonrepresentational psychologies that are grounded in the idea that parts of subjectivity address what is possible and not only what exists. It is concluded that psychology needs a much broader knowledge base and methodological canon, including armchair reflection, for an understanding of human mental life.

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