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The Theory of Risk Classification
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The Theory of Risk Classification (2000)The Theory of Risk ClassificationThe Quarterly Journal of Economics (2024)The Quarterly Journal of Econ…Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market (1994)Evidence on Adverse Selection…Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ∗ (1987)Some recent developments in t…Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Signaling Games and Stable Eq…The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information (1985)The efficiency of competitive…Information, trade and common knowledge (1982)Information, trade and common…Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information (1981)Resource Allocation Under Asy…Informational Equilibrium (1979)Informational EquilibriumIncentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Incentive Compatibility and t…The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity (1978)The Private and Social Value …The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets (1977)The Rat Race and Internal Lab…A model of insurance markets with incomplete information (1977)A model of insurance markets …Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Equilibrium in Competitive In…Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (1974)Overinsurance and Public Prov…Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities (1970)Political and Economic Evalua…EVALUATION OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME (1950)EVALUATION OF REAL NATIONAL I…Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium (1960)The Economics of Information (1961)Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention (1962)Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)First-mover advantages (1988)The Bargaining Problem (1950)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Financial intermediary-coalitions (1986)Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (1999)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Job Market Signaling (1973)Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing (1976)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Agreeing to Disagree (1976)On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets (1980)On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets (1980)Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders (1985)Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets (1990)The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality (1981)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Biological signals as handicaps (1990)Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (2003)Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Higher education as a filter (1973)INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION (1977)Understanding and Mitigating Uncertainty in Online Exchange Relationships: A Principal–Agent Perspective1 (2007)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality (2000)Corporate Green Bonds (2018)A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation (1999)Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment (2001)The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration (2003)
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References

  • 2024The Quarterly Journal of Economics7,413 cited
  • 1976Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information5,032 cited
  • 1987Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria3,227 cited
  • 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
  • 1982Information, trade and common knowledge1,738 cited
  • 1978The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity1,571 cited
  • 1977A model of insurance markets with incomplete information1,036 cited
  • 1974Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection707 cited
  • 1979Informational Equilibrium616 cited
  • 1981Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information434 cited
  • 1977The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets412 cited
  • 1970Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities350 cited
  • 1950EVALUATION OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME323 cited
  • 1987Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ∗294 cited
  • 1994Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market280 cited

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  • 1985The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information174 cited
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