On Being Alienated

Abstract

Abstract Disjunctivist theories advocate a type of naïve realism about veridical perception in that they support the common understanding that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. The sceptical argument from hallucination challenges the connection between naïve realism about perceptual experience and disjunctivism. This chapter focuses on identifying and elaborating the fundamental disagreements here. The first part presents the basic commitments of disjunctivism. This is followed by a formulation of the worry about the absence of phenomenal consciousness in relation to older concerns of absent qualia. Opposing models of how phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness fit together are sketched. In the final section, these models are connected to different reactions to external world scepticism.

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