Strategic Communication Before Price Haggling: A Tale of Two Orientations

Liang Guo

8 citations0/0 files storedMarketing Science

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Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing Merger and Competition Analysis Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

Uncommitted reference prices can be endogenously credible because buyer search can regulate both high-cost and low-cost sellers’ incentives for deceptive communication.

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References

1982Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model 1982Strategic Information Transmission 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications 1981The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality 2003A Bargaining Theory of Distribution Channels 2009When More Alternatives Lead to Less Choice 2009Cognition and Incomplete Contracts 2010Persuasion by Cheap Talk

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2023Price Dispersion, Bargaining Power, and Consumers’ Online Shopping Experience in e‐Commerce: Evidence from Online Transactions

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