Linguistic Interventions and the Ethics of Conceptual Disruption

Guido Löhr

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

Abstract Several authors in psychology and philosophy have recently raised the following question: when is it permissible to intentionally change the meaning and use of our words and concepts? I argue that an arguably prior question has received much less attention: Even if there were good moral or epistemic reasons for conceptual or semantic changes, this does not yet justify pushing or lobbying for such changes if they are socially and conceptually disruptive. In this paper, I develop the beginnings of an ethics of conceptual disruption as well as a set of norms of linguistic interventions based on it.

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2000Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?2009Doing without Concepts 2017Down Girl 2010Truth-Conditional Pragmatics 2016Concept Creep: Psychology's Expanding Concepts of Harm and Pathology 2020Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics 2013Replacing Truth 2013Conceptual Ethics I

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