Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion

Yeon‐Koo Che · Kyungmin Kim · Konrad Mierendorff

32 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Political Economy

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow’s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in Markov perfect equilibrium as the cost vanishes.

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2004Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits 1949Bayes and Minimax Solutions of Sequential Decision Problems 2014Implementing the “Wisdom of the Crowd”1989Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies 1986Optimal Control with State-Space Constraint. II 2001The Optimal Level of Experimentation 1947Foundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Functions 2007Influence through ignorance

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