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Optimal Dynamic Relative Performance Evaluation
16 references·0 citing·41 second hop
Optimal Dynamic Relative Performance Evaluation (2017)Optimal Dynamic Relative Performance Eval…Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts (2010)Relative Performance Evaluati…Peer firms in relative performance evaluation (2009)Peer firms in relative perfor…Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty (2006)Notes on Welfare Economics, I…Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad (2006)Asymmetric benchmarking in co…Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts (2003)Price versus Non-Price Perfor…Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (2003)Executive Equity Compensation…The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation (1999)The Other Side of the Trade‐O…Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence (1999)Executive Compensation, Strat…An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis (1992)An Empirical Investigation of…Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation (1989)Sensitivity, Precision, and L…The theory of contracts (1987)The theory of contractsAggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives (1986)An Empirical Investigation of…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)An Analysis of the Principal-…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsMoral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityEssays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance: theories, evidence, and a framework for research (2002)Subjectivity and the Weighting of Performance Measures: Evidence from a Balanced Scorecard (2003)Integrative strategic performance measurement systems, strategic alignment of manufacturing, learning and strategic outcomes: an exploratory study (2004)Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis, (2010)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations. (1994)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Contracting theory and accounting (2001)Executive compensation (2008)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior (1989)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? (1998)Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives (2003)The design and use of performance management systems: An extended framework for analysis (2009)CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation (2015)The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences (1985)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses (2004)Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance☆ (2009)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors (2008)Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance (2009)Executive compensation and corporate governance in China (2011)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms (1999)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories (1992)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)
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References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 1987The theory of contracts1,335 cited
  • 1999The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation1,037 cited
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  • 1999Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence734 cited
  • 2003Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey698 cited
  • 1986An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives677 cited
  • 2006Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad480 cited
  • 2006Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty391 cited
  • 2009Peer firms in relative performance evaluation350 cited
  • 2003Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts310 cited
  • 1992An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis

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305 cited
  • 2010Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts278 cited
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