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Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics
16 references·0 citing·49 second hop
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics (2023)Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: A…Using large-scale experiments and machine learning to discover theories of human decision-making (2021)Using large-scale experiments…Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist (2017)Strong Duality for a Multiple…The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014)The sample complexity of reve…A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2014)A Simple and Approximately Op…Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013)Designing Random Allocation M…Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (2012)Proceedings of the 13th ACM C…Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization (2012)Optimal Multi-dimensional Mec…An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms (2012)An algorithmic characterizati…Core-selecting package auctions (2007)Core-selecting package auctio…Combinatorial Auctions (2005)Combinatorial AuctionsBundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist (2005)Bundling as an optimal sellin…A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation (1995)A Contribution to the Pure Th…A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context (1987)A necessary and sufficient co…Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information (1983)Bundling Decisions by a Multi…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignStraightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies (1979)Straightforward Individual In…Monopoly and product quality (1978)Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers (2005)Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation (2006)The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2010)Two-Sided Matching (1990)Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009)Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (2012)School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation (2013)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values (1989)Haggling over substitutes (2003)The Design and Price of Information (2016)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. (1971)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities (1997)Retail Mergers, Buyer Power and Product Variety (2007)Procurement when price and quality matter (2010)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)On cores and indivisibility (1974)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds (2011)Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015)The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare (2019)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Equity, envy, and efficiency (1974)Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy. (1975)THE THEORY OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT PART I (1985)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information (2006)Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (1985)Auctions Versus Negotiations (1996)Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting (2019)The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies (2020)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty (1992)Beyond playing 20 questions with nature: Integrative experiment design in the social and behavioral sciences (2022)Using games to understand the mind (2024)Predicting human decisions with behavioural theories and machine learning (2025)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Position auctions (2006)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)
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  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 2005Combinatorial Auctions902 cited
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  • 1979Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies321 cited
  • 2013Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications304 cited
  • 2007Core-selecting package auctions274 cited
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  • 2005Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist207 cited
  • 1983Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information207 cited
  • 2014The sample complexity of revenue maximization198 cited
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  • 2017Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist164 cited
  • 1995A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation154 cited

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A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
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