Abstract A diverse bandwagon of academics is working with and celebrating the notion of phronesis, or ‘practical wisdom’, as a metacognitive capacity, guiding morally aspirational cognition and action. However, this new phronesis discourse is characterized by frequently unrecognized tensions, lacunae, and ambivalences. The book has five main aims: (1) to set the recently surging interest in phronesis (practical wisdom) in Psychology, Philosophy, Professional Ethics, and Education in an historical and theoretical context; (2) to analyse and elaborate upon Aristotle’s ‘standard model’ of phronesis in a philosophically credible way that allows for a psychologically serviceable and empirically tractable conceptualization; (3) to juxtapose our new Aristotelian phronesis model with a recent consensual model of wisdom in Psychology, and respond to different kinds of scepticism about the usefulness of the phronesis construct; (4) to elicit many practical implications of our model for the development and education of phronesis and its application in areas of professional practice and daily conduct; and (5) to explore the relevance of phronesis in areas that have mostly eluded investigation so far, including the spheres of civic/political virtues and collective (managerial) decision-making. The book works through some relevant puzzles created by the recent phronesis discourse. It ameliorates lacunae in the literature and pushes the research agenda in new, radically cross-disciplinary directions, drawing in equal measure on insights from Psychology, Philosophy, and Education. Through its revised and applied Aristotelianism, the book contributes to debates about the salience of phronesis within Moral Psychology, Moral Philosophy, Moral Education, and Professional Ethics.
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