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Implementing Executive Orders in the Administrative State
16 references·0 citing·44 second hop
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References

  • 1972Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis3,658 cited
  • 2011Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering3,199 cited
  • 1984Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms2,936 cited
  • 1983Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission1,432 cited
  • 1989Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies1,208 cited
  • 1998Pivotal Politics1,097 cited
  • 2005THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS869 cited
  • 1985Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB545 cited
  • 2008The Politics of Presidential Appointments540 cited
  • 1984The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)503 cited
  • 2007Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise496 cited
  • 2003Power without Persuasion489 cited
  • 1987An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance'441 cited
  • 1991Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents412 cited
  • 1996Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making

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404 cited
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