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Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
16 references·0 citing·20 second hop
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents (2004)Mechanisms for discrete optimization with…Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents (2001)Truthful mechanisms for one-p…Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Algorithmic Mechanism DesignComputationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000)Computationally feasible VCG …A Course in Game Theory (1994)A Course in Game TheoryMonopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Monopoly with Incomplete Info…A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm (1984)A complete solution to a clas…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Monopoly and product quality (1978)Monopoly and product qualityCharacterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (1977)Characterization of Satisfact…Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsMultipart pricing of public goods (1971)Multipart pricing of public g…An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)An Exploration in the Theory …COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Social Choice and Individual …RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS (1988)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Optimal Auction Design (1981)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd (2013)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychology (1999)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1995)On Economic Inequality (1973)Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets (2002)Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence (2009)
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References

  • 1951Social Choice and Individual Values.7,792 cited
  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1994A Course in Game Theory5,468 cited
  • 1971An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation4,520 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1978Monopoly and product quality3,305 cited
  • 1971Multipart pricing of public goods3,266 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design1,331 cited
  • 1984Monopoly with Incomplete Information1,144 cited
  • 1977Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods803 cited
  • 1984A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm648 cited
  • 2001Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents521 cited
  • 2000

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Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
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