SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Why Do Entrepreneurs Hold Large Ownership Shares? Testing Agency Theory Using Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth
16 references·1 citing·34 second hop
Why Do Entrepreneurs Hold Large Ownership Shares? Testing Agency Theory Using Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth (2002)Why Do Entrepreneurs Hold Large Ownership…Executive compensation (2008)Executive compensationAgency Costs and Ownership Structure (2000)Agency Costs and Ownership St…Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance (1999)Understanding the determinant…Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure (1998)Theory of the Firm: Manageria…The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance (1991)The Effects of Board Composit…Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence (1991)Optimal Incentive Contracts i…Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Performance Pay and Top-Manag…Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value (1990)Additional evidence on equity…Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Management ownership and mark…The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences (1985)The Structure of Corporate Ow…Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Corporate performance and man…The market for corporate control (1983)The market for corporate cont…Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…A Behavioral Finance Approach to Decision Making in Entrepreneurial Finance (2010)A Behavioral Finance Approach…Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Law and Finance (1998)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 (2003)The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)Agency Problems and Residual Claims (1983)The Method of Paired Comparisons. (1964)Performance Pay and Productivity (2000)What's the difference? diversity constructs as separation, variety, or disparity in organizations (2007)The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development (2011)The Nature of the Firm (1937)EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK* (1970)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust (1995)Why Is There Mandatory Retirement? (1979)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Top Incomes in the Long Run of History (2011)Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? (2005)Over-investment of free cash flow (2006)Revisiting the relation between environmental performance and environmental disclosure: An empirical analysis (2007)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1988Management ownership and market valuation6,910 cited
  • 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences6,243 cited
  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
  • 1981Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts4,568 cited
  • 1990Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value4,311 cited
  • 1983The market for corporate control4,145 cited
  • 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts3,084 cited
  • 1998Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure2,749 cited
  • 2000Agency Costs and Ownership Structure2,517 cited
  • 1999Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance2,502 cited
  • 2008Executive compensation2,390 cited
  • 1991The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance2,312 cited
  • 1991Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence1,876 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

1985
Corporate performance and managerial remuneration
1,756 cited

Cited by

  • 2010A Behavioral Finance Approach to Decision Making in Entrepreneurial Finance14 cited