The Professional Values of Public Managers, Policy Analysts and Politicians

Abstract

Public sector professionalism attracts attention for several reasons. First, traditional professions (law, medicine, clergy) are accorded considerable prestige. Historically, this may have been because these fields offered appropriately dignified employment to second sons of British aristocracy (Elliott, 1972). Contemporarily, it may be that professions have a certain snob appeal because they commonly require long periods of schooling to master an imposing body of knowledge as well as a period of apprenticeship for learning skills of practice (Etzioni, 1969). In addition, they often create a jargon that makes this knowledge incomprehensible to, and thus keeps them separated from, laymen. Functionally, professions have what Hughes (1959) termed a mandate -- a social mission to accomplish -- and i.e., discretion, to perform it. The prestige conferred by mandate, and autonomy granted by license, are desired by many occupational groups, whose claims to that status led Wilensky (1964) to wonder whether eventually we would see the professionalization of everyone. The notion that professionals require and merit autonomy in practice of their work has been explored by students of public administration. Ever since his article appeared, Woodrow Wilson's (1887) suggestion that administrators should merely execute with neutral competence directives enjoined upon them by legislative branch has been debated, and largely discredited (cf. Denhardt, 1984). Instead, emphasis is given to generous latitude most public administrators enjoy. This latitude sometimes is created by working conditions, since many public-sector workers, vividly termed street-level bureaucrats by Lipsky (1980), do much of their work away from direct supervision. Latitude also results when legislative intent is left ambiguous or vague so as to minimize opposition, requiring administrators to devise specifics of programs, rules and procedures. Finally, since it is impossible to devise laws that can cover every eventuality, administrators by virtue of their expertise may be only persons who can make effective front-line decisions. This necessary autonomy based in expertise makes a great deal of administrative work arguably professional. Citizens and their elected representatives have never been entirely comfortable, however, with extent of administrative discretion, for fear discretion will turn into unbridled authority). One family of prescriptions for controlling administrative activity utilizes formal mechanisms. Writing laws that provide detailed instructions concerning administration is one such method (Finer, 1941). Another is to require stringent evaluation and copious reporting. Another, advocated by James Madison at founding of republic, is to rely upon checks and balances of competitive forces to limit an agency's action. Other observers of administrative life have placed their faith in more subjective means. Rather than looking to external controls to limit bureaucrats' discretion, they have emphasized role of inner check (Gaus, cited in Friedrich, 1940) -- beliefs and values of individual administrator -- in ensuring that his or her actions will conform to norms of democratic process. Internalized control through values becomes more important as professional's zone of administrative discretion expands, as for example in decisions requiring advanced technical knowledge, which lay observers cannot easily second-guess. Values are also important when administrators act proactively to advocate for groups excluded from policy process, for proactive administrators must take care not to substitute their profession's values for those of their clients. Also, inner check is important when administrators must make decisions among alternatives that serve legally-sanctioned but competing values. In these situations, where choice is not prescribed nor proscribed by law, it will likely therefore be guided by personal or professional values (Wall, 1991). …

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