To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly MarketsSteffen Huck, Wieland Müller, Hans‐Theo Normann2002-02-01articleGames and Economic Behavior85 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesMerger and Competition AnalysisGame Theory and ApplicationsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 85 citations exist upstream.References1982An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining1990Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria1995Commitment and observability in games1999Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership2001Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets*Cited by2009An experimental investigation of asymmetric contests2017Who should be pricing leader in the presence of customer returns?20162. Using Experimental Methods to Understand Why and How We Give to Charity2004Playing Cournot although they shouldn?t2002Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: experimental evidence2005Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence2014Contests with endogenous entry2010“A profit table or a profit calculator?” A note on the design of Cournot oligopoly experiments