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Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers
16 references·1 citing·38 second hop
Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely Informed Policymakers (1992)Strategic Trade Policy With Incompletely …Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation (1995)Competing Vertical Structures…Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests (1993)Reputation and Equilibrium Ch…Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure (1991)Negotiated Trade Restrictions…Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments (1991)Game-Playing Agents: Unobserv…Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (1989)Reputation and Equilibrium Se…Countervailing incentives in agency problems (1989)Countervailing incentives in …The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)The Theory of Industrial Orga…Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (1988)Strategic Trade Policy and th…Empirical methods for international trade (1988)Empirical methods for interna…The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences (1987)The control of export credit …Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Using Cost Observation to Reg…Targeted export promotion with several oligopolistic industries (1986)Targeted export promotion wit…Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly (1986)Optimal Trade and Industrial …Export subsidies and international market share rivalry (1985)Export subsidies and internat…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems (1982)Optimal coordination mechanis…Dumping and double crossing: The (in)effectiveness of cost-based trade policy under incomplete information (2021)Dumping and double crossing: …The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts (1988)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Auctions and Bidding (1986)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2010)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (1992)Game Theory of Mind (2008)Optimal Information Disclosure (2010)A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction (1992)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders (1998)What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge (1998)The halse Promise of International Institutions (2017)Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence (1996)Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice (1997)Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure (2007)The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and the competitive consequences of Mrs. Thatcher (1987)Trade, Growth, and the Environment (2004)Trade, Growth, and the Environment (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1988The Theory of Industrial Organization8,578 cited
  • 1985Export subsidies and international market share rivalry1,935 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
  • 1986Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly1,119 cited
  • 1982Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems913 cited
  • 1989Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player483 cited
  • 1988Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics462 cited
  • 1989Countervailing incentives in agency problems417 cited
  • 1991Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments376 cited
  • 1986Targeted export promotion with several oligopolistic industries185 cited
  • 1995Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation146 cited
  • 1988Empirical methods for international trade117 cited
  • 1987The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences111 cited
  • 1993Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests110 cited

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1991
Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure
106 cited

Cited by

  • 2021Dumping and double crossing: The (in)effectiveness of cost-based trade policy under incomplete information10 cited