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Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems

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References

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1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information12,762 cited
1971An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation4,520 cited
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1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
1986Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations1,227 cited
1988The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts682 cited
1984A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm648 cited
1990Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs123 cited

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2009Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games71 cited
2012Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions34 cited
2006Optimal bunching without optimal control34 cited
2001Information systems, incentives and the timing of investments27 cited

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