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When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: choking under pressure as a screening device
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When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: choking under pressure as a screening device (2010)When high-powered incentive contracts red…Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes? (2009)Wall Street and Main Street: …Large Stakes and Big Mistakes (2009)Large Stakes and Big MistakesWhy Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? * (2008)Why Has CEO Pay Increased So …Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation (2008)Shareholder Rights, Boards, a…Executive compensation (2008)Executive compensationDo professionals choke under pressure? (2006)Do professionals choke under …When High-Powered People Fail (2005)When High-Powered People FailPerformance Pay and Productivity (2000)Performance Pay and Productiv…The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)The Provision of Incentives i…Are CEOS Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? (1997)Are CEOS Really Paid Like Bur…Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem (1994)Risk Aversion, Performance Pa…Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory (1994)Executive Compensation and Pr…Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement (1992)Incentive Contracts and Perfo…Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …Salaries and Piece Rates (1986)Salaries and Piece RatesChoking under pressure: Self-consciousness and paradoxical effects of incentives on skillful performance. (1984)Choking under pressure: Self-…Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives (2002)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Psychological foundations of incentives (2002)Identity and the Economics of Organizations (2005)Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition (1974)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives (1997)Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources (2007)CONTRACTING FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM U.S. CITIES * (2010)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Agency costs and innovation (1989)Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Social Facilitation (1965)Motivation Crowding Theory (2001)Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements? (2012)Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation? (2013)Pilot CEOs and corporate innovation (2016)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories (1999)Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms (2000)Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (2003)Inherited Control and Firm Performance (2006)Lost in translation? The effect of cultural values on mergers around the world (2012)The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications* (2020)Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (2003)Gender Differences in Preferences (2009)The External Control of Organizations. (1978)Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998 (2003)Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China (2004)Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans. (1995)Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences (2003)How Emotion Shapes Behavior: Feedback, Anticipation, and Reflection, Rather Than Direct Causation (2007)
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References

  • 1999The Provision of Incentives in Firms3,337 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 2000Performance Pay and Productivity2,491 cited
  • 2008Executive compensation2,390 cited
  • 2008Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? *1,822 cited
  • 1984Choking under pressure: Self-consciousness and paradoxical effects of incentives on skillful performance.1,661 cited
  • 1992Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement1,085 cited
  • 2009Large Stakes and Big Mistakes786 cited
  • 1986Salaries and Piece Rates715 cited
  • 1994Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory610 cited
  • 2005When High-Powered People Fail596 cited
  • 2009Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?477 cited
  • 1997Are CEOS Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?355 cited
  • 1994Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem349 cited
  • 2008Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation258 cited
  • 2006Do professionals choke under pressure?217 cited

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