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Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance Contracts
14 references·2 citing·47 second hop
Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance Contracts (1983)Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance …The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1995)The Market for “Lemons”: Qual…Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard (1983)Repeated insurance contracts …Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information (1982)Optimal Multiperiod Contracts…Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry (1982)Categorizing Risks in the Ins…Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship (1981)Monitoring Cooperative Agreem…An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident (1979)An Optimal Conviction Policy …Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets (1978)Product differentiation and p…The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets (1977)The Rat Race and Internal Lab…The permanent income hypothesis: A theoretical formulation (1977)The permanent income hypothes…A model of insurance markets with incomplete information (1977)A model of insurance markets …Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Equilibrium in Competitive In…Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)Equilibrium in Competitive In…An income fluctuation problem (1976)An income fluctuation problemThe Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)The Market for "Lemons": Qual…Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey (1992)Adverse Selection in Insuranc…Adverse Selection and the Middleman (1989)Adverse Selection and the Mid…Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis (1962)Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size (1994)Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications (2006)Job Market Signaling (1973)Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing (1976)Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition (1990)The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence (2000)Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market (2006)Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover (1979)Stability in Competition (1990)Financial Capacity and Output Fluctuations in an Economy with Multi-Period Financial Relationships (1992)Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers (2005)Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions (2007)A Theory of the Consumption Function (1958)A Theory of the Consumption Function (1960)Uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk and aggregate saving (2007)Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey (2012)Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data (2013)Some simple bitcoin economics (2019)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales (1976)Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment. (1987)Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough? (2000)Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets (2002)Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution (1974)The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information (1985)Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market (2005)Private Information and Insurance Rejections (2013)Incentives in Teams (1973)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects (2009)The Theory of Economic Growth (1956)Liquidity, Banks, and Markets (1997)Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms? (2010)An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism (2013)Higher education as a filter (1973)The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of Income (1975)Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium (2010)Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices * (2010)Handbook of Health Economics (2011)The Evolution of Cooperation (1981)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: Implications for Strategy Formulation (1991)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1970The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism22,977 cited
  • 1976Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information4,984 cited
  • 1977A model of insurance markets with incomplete information1,036 cited
  • 1995The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism536 cited
  • 1976Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information500 cited
  • 1977The permanent income hypothesis: A theoretical formulation436 cited
  • 1977The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets412 cited
  • 1981Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship405 cited
  • 1978Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets291 cited
  • 1982Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information270 cited
  • 1983Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard265 cited
  • 1982Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry161 cited
  • 1976An income fluctuation problem136 cited
  • 1979An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident104 cited

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  • 1992

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Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey
64 cited
  • 1989Adverse Selection and the Middleman32 cited