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Looking Back to Move Forward: Quantifying Policy Predictions in Political Decision Making
16 references·1 citing·38 second hop
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References

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  • 1991Information and Legislative Organization1,723 cited
  • 2002The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited1,172 cited
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  • 2011

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Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress
215 cited

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  • 2013Trying to Get What You Want9 cited