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On the Design of Managerial Incentive Structures in a Decentralized Planning Environment
0 references·11 citing·45 second hop
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Cited by

  • 1993The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields100 cited
  • 1982Design of incentive schemes and the new Soviet Incentive model95 cited
  • 1979Eliciting production possibilities from a well-informed manager75 cited
  • 1980On the Design of Incentives in Business Firms—A Survey of Some Research61 cited
  • 1979The incentive effects of plan targets and priorities in a disaggregated model56 cited
  • 2010Tournaments and managerial incentives in China's listed firms: New evidence49 cited
  • 1996The determinants of chief executive compensation in transitional economies: Evidence from Bulgaria47 cited
  • 1984Incentives in government contracts32 cited
  • 1979Information, motivation, and control in decentralized planning: the case of discretionary managerial behavior22 cited
  • 2006CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data19 cited
  • 1981Limitations on the use of information-revealing incentive schemes in economic organizations13 cited

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