Stock Options, Restricted Stock, and IncentivesRichard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker2004-01-01preprintSSRN Electronic Journal108 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Corporate Finance and GovernanceAccounting and Organizational ManagementStochastic processes and financial applicationsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 108 citations exist upstream.References1979Moral Hazard and Observability1982Moral Hazard in Teams1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications2008Executive compensation1999Chapter 38 Executive compensation1999The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels2002Stock options for undiversified executives2001Contracting theory and accountingCited by2019Do incentives work? Option-based compensation and corporate innovation2017How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?2008Performance-vested stock options and interest alignment2004The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for Compensation Structure and Risk-Taking Incentives of CEOs2009The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Cost of Equity: Empirical Evidence from Pakistani Listed Companies2008How Important are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?2004Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk2007Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives