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The Role of Transfer Price for Coordination and Control within a Firm
16 references·0 citing·38 second hop
The Role of Transfer Price for Coordination and Control within a Firm (2000)The Role of Transfer Price for Coordinati…Collusion Under Asymmetric Information (1997)Collusion Under Asymmetric In…Specific Investment Under Negotiated Transfer Pricing: An Efficiency Result. (1995)Specific Investment Under Neg…Value of communication in agencies (1989)Value of communication in age…Countervailing incentives in agency problems (1989)Countervailing incentives in …On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection (1987)On the design of incentive sc…Competition for Agency Contracts (1987)Competition for Agency Contra…Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Using Cost Observation to Reg…Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing (1984)Regulation, Asymmetric Inform…Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Monopoly with Incomplete Info…A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm (1984)A complete solution to a clas…Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Efficient mechanisms for bila…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation (1982)Asymmetric Information, Incen…Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Monopoly and product quality (1978)Monopoly and product qualityTheory of Value (1959)Theory of ValueThe Economics of Welfare (1933)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Optimal Auction Design (1981)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts (1988)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures (1999)Corporate tax evasion with agency costs (2004)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Auctions and Bidding (1986)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2010)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)On Moral Hazard and Insurance (1979)Redistributive taxation as social insurance (1980)A Theory of Wage Dynamics (1982)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)ASSET REDEPLOYMENT, ACQUISITIONS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY IN DECLINING INDUSTRIES (1997)INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE S-CURVE HYPOTHESIS. (2004)The anatomy of bank diversification (2009)Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd (2013)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness (2005)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Agency Problems and Residual Claims (1983)Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychology (1999)
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References

  • 1978Monopoly and product quality3,305 cited
  • 1959Theory of Value2,538 cited
  • 1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading2,512 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
  • 1984Monopoly with Incomplete Information1,144 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1984A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm648 cited
  • 1982Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation478 cited
  • 1989Countervailing incentives in agency problems417 cited
  • 1984Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing380 cited
  • 1997Collusion Under Asymmetric Information333 cited
  • 1987Competition for Agency Contracts246 cited
  • 1987On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection124 cited
  • 1989Value of communication in agencies124 cited
  • 1995Specific Investment Under Negotiated Transfer Pricing: An Efficiency Result.

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