SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
A NOTE ON THE INTEGRAL REPRESENTATION OF THE VALUE FUNCTION
9 references·0 citing·30 second hop
A NOTE ON THE INTEGRAL REPRESENTATION OF THE VALUE FUNCTION (2014)A NOTE ON THE INTEGRAL REPRESENTATION OF …Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design (2001)Convex Potentials with an App…A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms (1999)A characterization of efficie…A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation (1994)A theory of incentives in pro…A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (1993)A Theory of Incentives in Pro…Game theory: analysis of conflict (1992)Game theory: analysis of conf…Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Monopoly with Incomplete Info…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …Monopoly and product quality (1978)Monopoly and product qualityAn Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)An Exploration in the Theory …The Economics of Welfare (1933)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Optimal Auction Design (1981)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback (2005)Internet auctions with many traders (2005)On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation (2013)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development (1996)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics (2002)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions (2000)Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities (2002)Monotonicity and Implementability (2010)Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations (2015)Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd (2013)Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe (2010)The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (2012)On Economic Inequality (1973)Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets (2002)Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence (2009)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1971An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation4,520 cited
  • 1992Game theory: analysis of conflict3,325 cited
  • 1978Monopoly and product quality3,305 cited
  • 1993A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation3,005 cited
  • 1994A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation2,554 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1984Monopoly with Incomplete Information1,144 cited
  • 1999A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms182 cited
  • 2001Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design140 cited

Cited by

No citing works inside the corpus for this window.

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work