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Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge · Study

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ArticleOptimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge

Huasheng Gao2010

Article2010

Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge

105 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Financial Economics

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Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Risk Management in Financial Firms

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1973The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers 1973Theory of Rational Option Pricing 2005Theory of rational option pricing 2003Corporate Governance and Equity Prices 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design 1997Industry costs of equity

Cited by

2021Methodological Variation in Empirical Corporate Finance 2021Talk Less, Learn More: Strategic Disclosure in Response to Managerial Learning from the Options Market 2020Stakeholder Agency Relationships: CEO Stock Options and Corporate Tax Avoidance 2017How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?2014Why Do Insiders Hedge Their Ownership? An Empirical Examination 2017CEO Turnover in Large Banks: Does Tail Risk Matter?

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2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.chapter · 30 shared references 2001Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Surveypreprint · 24 shared references 2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidencepreprint · 22 shared references 2003Executive Compensation and Managerial Risk-Takingpreprint · 20 shared references 2010CEO Compensationreport · 18 shared references 2012Do CEO compensation incentives affect firm innovation?article · 18 shared references

Details

Year2010

Typearticle

Published2010-04-02

VenueJournal of Financial Economics

ISSN-L0304-405X

Languageen

Citations105

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.015

openalex_workW1993082294

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2008How Important are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?

2012Trading by Bank Insiders Before and During the Financial Crisis