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Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model · Study

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ArticleMonitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model

Nirvikar Singh1985

Article1985

Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model

70 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Political Economy

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Auction Theory and Applications

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References

1977Organization Design 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem 1974What Do Bosses Do?1976The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization 1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems 1977On incentives and control in organizations 1982Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem

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2000Optimal Insurance under Moral Hazard 1991Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development 2002Another Look at the Radner–Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information 1991Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives 2005Flattening the Organization: The Effect of Organizational Reporting Structure on Budgeting Effectiveness 1991Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition 1988AGENCY THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

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Year1985

Typearticle

Published1985-06-01

VenueJournal of Political Economy

ISSN-L0022-3808

Languageen

Citations70

Files0 public / 0

ShelfGame Theory and Applications

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doi10.1086/261318

openalex_workW1995408162

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2017

Differentiating control, monitoring and oversight