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Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model

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References

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1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems870 cited
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1977On incentives and control in organizations251 cited
1982Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem188 cited

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2002Another Look at the Radner–Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information65 cited
1991Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives58 cited
1991Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships37 cited
2005Flattening the Organization: The Effect of Organizational Reporting Structure on Budgeting Effectiveness32 cited
1991Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition26 cited
1988AGENCY THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS23 cited

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2017

Differentiating control, monitoring and oversight

20 cited

1991Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk‐Neutral Agents17 cited