Citation map · Study

SZodixStudyAcademic Library

Shelves Open access

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

Strategic responses to automobile emissions control: A game-theoretic analysis

13 references·3 citing·33 second hop

FromToDepth

this work references cited by second hop

References

1976Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.13,469 cited
1967The symbolic uses of politics2,050 cited
1965The Symbolic Uses of Politics.1,858 cited
1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
1982Sequential Equilibria1,703 cited
1985Repeated Moral Hazard614 cited
1985Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect517 cited
1980The "Ratchet Principle" and Performance Incentives455 cited
1984Regulation and information in a continuing relationship438 cited
1985Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting383 cited
1987Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship144 cited
1982Design of incentive schemes and the new Soviet Incentive model95 cited
1982Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Information65 cited

Cited by

2011Linking induced technological change, and environmental regulation: Evidence from patenting in the U.S. auto industry224 cited
2005Implementing technology-forcing policies: The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments and the introduction of advanced automotive emissions controls in the United States

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

187 cited

1991Permanent versus interim regulations: A game-theoretic analysis22 cited