BEING FAIR OR APPEARING FAIR: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN ULTIMATUM BARGAINING.

Madan M. Pillutla · J. Keith Murnighan

152 citations0/0 files storedAcademy of Management Journal

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Conflict Management and Negotiation Social Power and Status Dynamics

Abstract

This article presents the results of two experiments that investigated fairness and apparent fairness in ultimatum negotiations. Results suggest that offerers—those presenting offers—were both stra...

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1954A Theory of Social Comparison Processes 1971The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism 1988Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health.1975Markets and Hierarchies 1985THE HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE 1982An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining 1986Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics

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2008A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires.2010Understanding the effects of substantive responses on trust following a transgression 1999THE INFORMATION DILEMMA IN NEGOTIATIONS: EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE, INCENTIVES, AND INTEGRATIVE POTENTIAL 2009Fairness considerations: Increasing understanding of intentionality during adolescence 2002Barriers to Resolution in Ideologically Based Negotiations: The Role of Values and Institutions 2005

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