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Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment

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References

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Cited by

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2018Parity, prospects, and predominance8 cited
2017De Finetti and Savage on the normative relevance of imprecise reasoning: a reply to Arthmar and Brady8 cited
2006Distinguishing indeterminate belief from “risk-averse” preferences7 cited
2013Good Decisions, Good Causes: Optimality as a Constraint on Attribution of Causal Responsibility6 cited
2015Minimizing regret in dynamic decision problems6 cited
2020The ecological rationality of decision criteria4 cited
2013Weak rationality and imprecise choice2 cited
2026The precision fallacy: On the futility of preference purification1 cited
2009On the Rationality of Decisions with Unreliable Probabilities0 cited
2015Non-probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Veil0 cited