Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment

Isaac Levi

95 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Probability and Statistical Research Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Abstract

Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.

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1961Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms 1956Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science 1975Mind, Language and Reality 1963Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.1965The Logic of Decision 1971Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations 1952Rational Decisions 1974On Indeterminate Probabilities

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