References

• 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information2,375 cited
• 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
• 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
• 1998Money Is Memory696 cited
• 2006Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships674 cited
• 1998Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring254 cited
• 2002Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring156 cited
• 2005Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games142 cited
• 2025Long-Term Competition — A Game-Theoretic Analysis117 cited
• 2006The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring105 cited
• 1994Equilibrium in Supergames96 cited
• 2004Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players86 cited
• 2011The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring64 cited
• 2008Folk theorem with communication62 cited
• 1987On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information53 cited
• 2004