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Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
15 references·16 citing·43 second hop
Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing (1984)Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and A…The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates (1990)The General Welfare in Relati…Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Using Cost Observation to Reg…Regulation and information in a continuing relationship (1984)Regulation and information in…Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Regulating a Monopolist with …A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues (1982)A Model of the Demand for Inv…Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information (1981)Resource Allocation Under Asy…Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Good News and Bad News: Repre…Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems (1980)Economically Optimal Performa…The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility (1979)The Implementation of Social …Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Optimal contracts and competi…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityIncentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Incentive Compatibility and t…A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation (1979)A Decentralized Method for Ut…The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization (1976)The Optimal Structure of Ince…Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Reexamination of the perfectn…Chapter 64 Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization (2007)Chapter 64 Structural Econome…Chapter 16 Regulation of Natural Monopoly (2007)Chapter 16 Regulation of Natu…Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information (2004)Consumer Privacy and the Mark…Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America (2003)Renegotiation of Concession C…Is no News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model (1997)Is no News Bad News? Informat…On the optimality of allowing collusion (1996)On the optimality of allowing…The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After (1994)The New Economics of Regulati…Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules (1994)Pretrial Bargaining and the D…Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies (1993)Hierarchical design and enfor…Advances in Economic Theory - Fifth World Congress. (1989)Advances in Economic Theory -…Optimal contracts with public ex post information (1988)Optimal contracts with public…Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions (1988)Government Intervention in Pr…Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting (1987)Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asy…Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship (1987)Commitment and Fairness in a …Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance (1986)Equilibrium Verification and …Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality (1985)Noncooperative Regulation of …The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)The Bargaining Problem (1950)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)The New Economics of Organization (1984)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Industrial organization, corporate strategy and structure (1980)The Socialist System (1992)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing (2016)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts (1988)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Non-cooperative games (1989)Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2005)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Theory of Value (1959)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt (1991)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Incentives in Teams (1973)Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Delegation and the theory of the firm (1989)The Possibility of Social Choice (1999)Prices vs. Quantities (1974)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions (1993)Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review (2002)Why new issues are underpriced (1986)Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time (2004)Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms☆ (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1975Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games3,342 cited
  • 1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification3,201 cited
  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
  • 1982A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues931 cited
  • 1976The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization870 cited
  • 1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility809 cited
  • 1990The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates626 cited
  • 1984Regulation and information in a continuing relationship438 cited
  • 1981Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information434 cited
  • 1980Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems354 cited
  • 1979A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation

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349 cited

Cited by

  • 2004Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information407 cited
  • 1994The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After285 cited
  • 1986Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance277 cited
  • 1989Advances in Economic Theory - Fifth World Congress.192 cited
  • 2007Chapter 64 Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization180 cited
  • 1988Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions169 cited
  • 2003Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America155 cited
  • 1993Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies154 cited
  • 2007Chapter 16 Regulation of Natural Monopoly148 cited
  • 1996On the optimality of allowing collusion145 cited
  • 1987Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship144 cited
  • 1997Is no News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model138 cited
  • 1988Optimal contracts with public ex post information134 cited
  • 1985Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality134 cited
  • 1987Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting128 cited
  • 1994Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules126 cited